This paper proposes a SCP-ECG security extension after having analyzed the features of this standard, its security requirements and the current measures implemented by other medical protocols. Our approach permits SCP-ECG files to be stored safely and proper access to be granted (or denied) to users for different purposes: interpretation of the test, consultation, clinical research or teaching. The access privileges are scaled by means of role-based profiles supported by cryptographic elements (ciphering, digital certificates and digital signatures). These elements are arranged as metadata into a new section which extends the protocol and protects the remaining sections. The application built to implement this approach has been extensively tested, showing its capacity to authenticate users and to protect the integrity of files and the privacy of sensitive data, with a low impact on file size and access time. In addition, this solution is compatible with any version of the SCP-ECG and can be easily integrated into e-health platforms.
Introduction
Digital medical tests are one of the pillars for the development of e-health, a new medical paradigm which enables the implementation of new ICT-based services (e.g. telemonitoring, ePrescribing) and the reduction of costs for patients and healthcare systems. Electrocardiograms (ECGs) have an important place in this model since these non-invasive and cheap tests are a useful tool for the detection and diagnosis of heart disease.
Digital ECG files often include metadata: additional information such as personal patient data and health status, ECG measures or the diagnosis. The medical interpretation is based on the waveform delineation (P waves, T waves, QRS complexes), length and amplitude of intervals (RR interval, QT interval, ST level, etc.), heart rate and orientation of the electrical axis. Since the normal value range of these parameters is quite narrow, even minor modifications in a small part of the record can affect the cardiologist's diagnosis. Besides, personal data must be treated with special care since it identifies the patient and his/her medical condition. Consequently, the protection of these tests at the storage point and during transmission is required by several governmental regulations (e.g. the HI-PAA [1] , the PIPEDA [2] , the LOPD [3] , the Digital Signature Laws in several countries, etc.). Two general requisites must be guaranteed:
Reliability, which implies: -authentication of ECG tests and users; -integrity, the ECG record and its associated data has to be genuine and complete. Privacy, to protect the patient's data. This sensitive information can only be shared under the principles of: -Purpose binding, personal and medical data obtained for one purpose (e.g. diagnosis) should not be used for another purpose without the patient's informed consent. In the e-health context, since medical tests contain data which are potentially beneficial for different purposes (e.g. research, teaching), the acquiring entity should urge the patient to accept its disclosure after an adequate de-identification. -Necessity of data collection and processing, the collection and processing of health data shall only be allowed if it is necessary for tasks falling within the responsibility of the user (e.g. the expert who interprets the test shall be allowed to edit the diagnosis, but the rest of clinicians caring for the patient shall only be allowed to read the test). -Transparency, patients should have the opportunity of consulting who has accessed their data and for what purpose.
These security requirements should be resolved from the technical viewpoint through standardization. Nowadays there are several protocols for the storage and exchange of ECGs, the most widespread being the Standard Communication Protocol for Computer-Assisted Electrocardiography (SCP-ECG [4] , ISO standard), the Health Level Seven (HL7 aECG [5] , American standard ANSI), the Medical waveform description Format Encoding Rules (MFER [6] , Japanese standard) and the Digital Imaging and Communication in Medicine (DICOM Supplement 30 [7] , American standard NEMA). An extensive review of ECG standards can be found in [8] . While these standards specialize in different use cases (diagnostic examinations, home care, emergency care, etc.) and use different storage formats (binary encoded, XML-based [9] ), they all face the same security issues. Security standardization has been promoted by protocols such as DICOM, which dedicates its Working Group 14 to this issue, and HL7, which has its Security Working Group; organizations such as Integrating The Healthcare (IHE); and joint committees such as JIRA/NEMA/COCIR. As a result, DICOM has issued many supplements (31, 41, 51, 55, 86, 95, 142) which, together with Part 15 of the protocol [10] , cover security based on different secure profiles regarding: use, transport, digital signature and online media storage (among others). HL7 has also published several documents about security, notably its Secure Transactions Standard [11] , Security Risk Assessment Cookbook [12] and Role-Based Access Control [13] . The MFER does not directly address security, but neither does it include patient data except by means of HL7. It can thus benefit from HL7 security policies/recommendations.
Although the SCP-ECG is a popular protocol, supported by around 70% of the major manufacturers of ECG devices and recently approved as an international standard (ISO/IEEE 11073-91064:200), it gives little consideration to data security or privacy. SCP-ECG files must be adequately protected to avoid data leaking and malicious manipulation, which could result in patients' embarrassment, wrong diagnosis and legal actions against hospitals. The aim of this work is to approach this issue and present a solution in line with the security policies of the major medical protocols, HL7 and DICOM. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the SCP-ECG and its security requirements, Section 3 introduces the security approach, Section 4 specifies how it is fitted into the standard and Section 5 evaluates the implementation. Finally, the results are discussed in Section 6.
Materials and methods
The SCP-ECG is a widespread medical protocol whose security extension must be designed carefully. In the first place the main aspects of this standard must be analyzed in detail (Sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4), since the extension must be in harmony with the scope of the protocol, maintain its structure, protect adequately and be able to retrieve its exact contents, not change substantially its file sizes and associated delays and allow interoperability with existing devices and software.
Secondly the measures adopted by other major medical protocols to enforce reliability and privacy must be surveyed (Section 2.5). Third, and the main aim of this section, the security measures that the SCP-ECG shall implement must be accurately established. These are the previous steps to develop an adequate protection policy for the SCP-ECG, which will lead to its security extension. To carry out these tasks the former experience of the authors with medical protocols [14, 15, 8] and ECG signals [16] and the opinion of three independent cardiologists have been used.
SCP-ECG scope
With the spread of digital electrocardiography, the SCP-ECG was created in the early 90s to allow the storage of ECGs and the interchange between medical ECG devices (carts) and ECG user systems. It was initially supported by the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) to achieve interoperability among most medical ECG equipment. Now it is integrated in the ISO/IEEE 11073 family and the goal is more ambitious: to interoperate with other medical devices as well. Nevertheless, harmonization is needed to coordinate both standards [15] .
The SCP-ECG defines a binary encoded format of data and mechanisms for the compression of the ECG signal in order to reduce the final size of the ECG file. This permits the transmission of ECGs in scenarios with low transmission ratios and the saving of disk space in storage. Although the SCP-ECG was primarily intended for 12-lead records in short-term tests, it allows different numbers of leads and it has been successfully adapted to stress tests, Holter recordings and real-time transmission [17, 14] .
This standard also supports ECG measurements (i.e. average RR intervals), ECG feature extraction (i.e. onset/offset of P waves and QRS complexes), pattern recognition, ECG interpretation (i.e. normal ECG, left ventricular hypertrophy, left anterior fascicular block, posterior myocardial infarction) and diagnostic classification.
Regarding SCP-ECG compliant software, there are many freely available programs (see [18] ) including viewers, writers, parsers, format and content checkers. There are also methods for the harmonization of this ECG standard with others, such as the aforementioned DICOM Waveform Supplement 30 [19] , HL7 aECG [20] and MFER (Part 2.6 of the protocol).
SCP-ECG structure and data content
The SCP-ECG is divided into 12 different sections, defined by its own encoding rules and preceded by a common header (see Fig. 1 ). Regarding their contents, five different groups may be distinguished:
Section 0: this stores the pointers to the start of the remaining sections in the record. This section does not contain any information itself, so it is considered as public. A, Section 1 -tags 0-3, 5, 14-26, 31: these fields contain the identification of the patient and the physician/s, institution/s and device/s involved in the acquisition, analysis and diagnosis of the ECG. These data must be considered as highly confidential since they can identify the patient (directly or indirectly) in a file full of health data. B, Section 1 -tags 4, 6-13, 27-30, 32-35, 255: these contain general information about the patient (e.g. age, weight, height), his/her health condition (e.g. medical history, drugs) and data for the correct interpretation of the ECG (type of filtering applied). This part (together with parts C and D) may be used to find correlations between medical condition of large groups of patients and the more likely causes/risk factors for a variety of heart diseases. In terms of privacy, these data itself do not identify the patient. C, Sections 2-6: these identify the leads which are present in the record (Section 3) and store the ECG signal data (Section 6), which may be kept as uncompressed raw data or alternatively compressed by different methods. The compression ratio which can be achieved ranges from less than 2-4:1, when only using Huffman tables (Section 2), or up to 6-20:1 when combining second-order differences (using Sections 4 and 5) with Huffman encoding and downsampling, at the cost of lower signal quality. In the absence of patient identification, (A), this information cannot be used against the patient: even if it is used for biometric identification, another ECG from the same patient must be known previously, so no new information is obtained. D, Sections 7-11: these sections can be optionally added to include:
1. global measurements (Section 7) and measurements from each lead independently (Section 10), to help the physician's work;
2. the diagnostic interpretation of the ECG record (Section 8), which must be consistent with the manufacturer interpretive statements (Section 9) and the universal ECG interpretive statement codes and coding rules (Section 11); These data interprets or helps to interpret the ECG of the patient, so if he/she is identified (A), this information must be treated with strict confidentiality. 
SCP-ECG messaging/transport protocol
Since the standard is intended for the exchange of SCP-ECG files, between ECG medical devices (carts) or between carts and user devices (computers, PDAs, smartphones, etc.), it dedicates:
Annex D to recommending a simple architecture and a set of control (ID, Status, Done, Advisory) and request messages to send/receive (a) ECGs (types S, R), (b) ECG lists for specified patients (types E, L), or (c) patient lists for specified names (types I, P); and Annex E to giving a possible solution for low level transport of data (physical function and data link function layers).
Protecting the communications involving patient data is as important as protecting the SCP-ECG files, so this issue must be addressed in the security policy.
File size and access delays
The size of SCP-ECG files is highly concentrated in its part C, which stores the signal. This protocol supports the storage of raw signals and the use of simple compression methods, which depending on the signal length achieve compression rates ranging from 2-4:1 (lossless compression) to 6-20:1 (lossy compression). Assuming that the typical signal duration ranges from 10 to 30 s and the acquisition bitrate from 3000 bps (e.g. MIT-BIH Compression database [21] ) to 8000 bps (e.g. T-Wave Alternans Challenge database [22] Regarding the remaining parts, A, composed of up to 19 fields, typically takes less than 1 KB since it only contains IDs, names and free-text short descriptions. Part [B] , composed of up to 18 fields, typically takes less than 0.5 KB since most fields are described with 1-4 bytes and only a few require free-text description. Part [D] , composed of up to 5 sections, is not expected to be larger than 2 KB, mainly contributed by Section 8 (expected less than 0.35 KB) and Section 11 (expected less than 1.2 KB). Since only four fields of part A (2, 14, 25, 26) and part C are mandatory, the minimum expectable file size is ' 7:4 : KB. In the opposite case, the maximum expectable size of a file is the sum of maximum of each part, ðAÞ 1 KB þ ðBÞ 0:5 KB þ ðCÞ 351:6 KB þ ðDÞ 2 KB ¼ 355 KB. In the most typical cases, the expectable size is ' ðAÞ 0:5 KB þ ðBÞ 0:25 KB þ ðCÞ 29:3 KB þ ðDÞ 1 KB ¼ 31 KB.
The delays associated to the SCP-ECG may de divided into:
Collection of information about the patient and the recording session to complete parts A and [B] . It depends on the means, a person typing the data can spend several seconds (typ. a minute) on this task, while a proper connection to a patients database speeds up this operation (to typ. 0.2-0.5 s). Acquisition of the signal, to be stored in part C. This is equal to the signal duration, between 10 and 30 s. If the signal is compressed, there is a small additional delay of ' 50 ms. Analysis of the signal to obtain part [D] . It comprises the obtaining of global measurements and measures from each lead independently (40-120 ms) and its interpretation by a cardiologists (P1 min) and sometimes an analyzing device (10-30 ms). Access to the file contents by using an application. Loading the data fields and plotting the signal leads on screen typically takes less than 50 ms.
Two typical delays can be obtained from these data, (1) the delay to obtain a basic SCP-ECG file (parts A, [B] and C) is ' 10 À 30 s, and (2) the delay to access the file and interpret it (using and/or completing part [D] ) is ' 1 min. 
Security in medical protocols
In order to design an adequate security extension for the SCP-ECG, it is necessary to analyze the security supplements and recommendations of the main medical protocols and to understand the differences between these protocols and the SCP-ECG. This will lead to an evaluation, from the SCP-ECG perspective, of the appropriateness of the security measures driven by HL7 and DICOM:
Developing risk management frameworks in order to identify, assess and judge risks in Healthcare IT. These frameworks help to improve the management of personal health information, patient safety, trust between organizations and the avoidance of technology risks. Implementing Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). Several role types, work profiles, tasks, scenarios, steps and permissions are defined to make this policy work. The benefits of RBAC are the reduction of administrative costs, the improvement of security, the simplification of authorization management and the enhancement of partner interoperability. Performing attribute-level encryption (or de-identification). The same file can be used for different purposes (e.g. teaching files, clinical trials, etc.) if different subsets of data are protected in a different manner (e.g. using different cryptographic keys). Context envelopes are an example of implementation, including:
-Data integrity checks.
-Confidentiality via encryption.
-Access limited to targeted recipients.
-Media Storage Security Profiles. Integrating Audit Trail and Node Authentication (ATNA) profiles. These contribute to access control by limiting network access. Each profile comprises:
-User authentication, which is local for each node.
-Connection authentication between nodes.
-Audit trails for user accountability. Using secure communications channels, which must ensure data integrity during transit, entity authentication and confidentiality during transit via encryption. This protects against eavesdropping, masquerading and tampering. Developing secure online electronic storage profiles, which allow the status of protocol instances to be tracked and verified in those cases where local security policies require the tracking of the original data set and subsequent copies. Embedding Digital Signatures (DS), which -Ensure data integrity for the life of the file.
-Identify signatories, with optional timestamps.
-May be included in Digital Signature Profiles (Base, Creator and Authorization RSA Profiles). -May be included in Structured Reports.
These measures fit within the complexity and wide scope of HL7 and DICOM. Nevertheless, the SCP-ECG is a much more restricted protocol (specialized in ECG records, not attaching media files, with easily separable contents, one-to-one low-level communications and low file size), so its security extension needs to be robust but also have the appropriate degree of complexity. Among the security measures listed above, some turn out:
Essential: Digital Signatures, secure communications, RoleBased Access Control, attribute level encryption. These permit a robust security policy to be developed with moderate resources. Interesting: Audit Trail and Node Authentication, risk assessment policies. These help to refine the basic security policy by adding smart management of access permissions, detection of misuse and search for risks in the security scheme.
Unnecessary: online electronic storage, the SCP-ECG does not define a high-level communications architecture between hosts.
Our focus is on the measures classified as essential, leaving hooks for the adoption of ATNA (see Section 3.1). Regarding implementation, several cryptographic protocols and algorithms are commonly used by HL7 and DICOM to carry out these tasks: New algorithms for signature (Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [26] , Electronic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [27] ) and ciphering (Twofish, Blowfish, RC6) will be added in this extension to improve security, privacy and compatibility between systems. The insecure hash function MD-5 will not be included.
Protection proposal
The protection policy relies on the four essential principles described in Section 2.5: definition of security profiles, ciphering and signing the contents, and securing the communications. This approach uses cryptography to add a layer of protection to the SCP-ECG files, which guarantees that corruption of data can be detected and that access to the file is suitably controlled.
The file is initially divided into four different parts according to Section 2.2 (A, patient ID; [B] , general patient data, health status and medication; C, ECG signal and [D], ECG measures and interpretation), which may be considered as public or private. Different kinds of ciphering are applied depending on this distinction (more complex in the latter case), in order to balance the level of security and the resources deployed. While the digital signature ensures the reliability of all the parts, privacy of certain contents may be left out (after de-identification of the patient) for potentially beneficial purposes (e.g. teaching, research) unless the patient dissents. Since the communications involving SCP-ECG devices include ECG files and personal health information, they will be protected reusing some of the previously cited security elements.
Using security profiles for Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
Since the ECG files may be requested for different uses, a RBAC policy is proposed which preserves the principles of data processing and purpose binding of privacy. Thus the ECG agent (a person, a program or the acquisition device itself) decides on the privileges and type of information the user is allowed to access (parts A, [B], C or [D] -see Section 2.2-) according to his/her profile. Besides, all granted access to a SCP-ECG file will be recorded in a field of the agent's file, the Secure Access Record (SAR), to uphold the transparency principle of privacy. Sophisticated ATNA policies (see Section 2.5) may be defined on top of this (1) to automatize the security profiles administration and prevent situations of overload and (2) to carry out audit trails, based on the SAR, for the detection of improper creation, access and modification of personal health information.
The profiles proposed here were defined after consultation with the cardiologists. Each profile is intended for a different use of the ECG test (see Fig. 3-B) and implements adequate security measures and access privileges (see Fig. 2 The security profiles use attribute-level encryption in a manner similar to that of the Context Envelopes defined by DICOM. The content of the parts is sealed by means of encryption and the syntax to make them retrievable to the targeted user (or to all users, according to the profile) is placed in a new section (see Section 4). It would be possible to implement several profiles for several users in a single file, but this would lead to too large an increase in the size of the syntax with respect to the average size of a SCP-ECG file. Thus, each protected SCP-ECG file implements one security profile only.
Ciphering the contents with attribute-level encryption
Two different ciphering schemes are defined to implement the attribute (part)-level encryption used by the security profiles described in Section 3.1:
Public ciphering for non-confidential parts, whose symmetric key and Initialization Vector (IV) are obtained from the Digital Signature (DS, see Section 3.3) of the file, in order to raise awareness about this public security element. This ciphering prevents the use of regular SCP-ECG viewers to display the public parts without having checked the reliability of the file previously. Private ciphering for confidential parts, whose symmetric key is encrypted with the public key of the intended user and whose IV is obtained from the DS.
The two existing cryptographic modalities, symmetric and asymmetric, have been combined to obtain an optimum tradeoff security-performance. (1) Symmetric cryptography, which operates very fast, is used to obfuscate the content of the sections. A secret key and an IV are used for ciphering and deciphering, which provides confidentiality. The symmetric cipher (AES [23] , Blowfish, RC6, Twofish or 3DES) operates in Output Feedback Mode (OFB) since it makes cryptanalysis more difficult and it does not require extra bytes for padding. (2) Asymmetric cryptography, which is safer and does not need previous key arrangements to start, is used to protect symmetric keys and hashes, thus achieving confidentiality and authentication. It uses a key pair (public key, private key) for ciphering and deciphering or vice versa. Table 1 .
Both public and private ciphering enable fast operation and bind integrity with confidentiality and authentication. Fig. 2 illustrates which security item protects the symmetric key that ciphers each SCP-ECG part, depending on the security profile. It is important to understand that when some part is protected by: the private key of the agent, everyone has access; the public key of the agent, only the agent has access; the public key of the user, only that user has access.
Resistance to attacks
The security of the proposed ciphering schemes is analyzed:
Resistance of public ciphering: Man-in-the-middle attacks for manipulation would not succeed since modifying data automatically invalidates the DS. To succeed in forgery/manipulation, an attacker would need to find out the private key of the agent, calculate a valid DS for the modified file, derive from it the new key and IV and re-cipher. Eavesdropping is not prevented but the contents protected with public ciphering do not identify the patient.
Resistance of private ciphering: To manipulate/forge the file and avoid detection, an attacker would need to (1) break the confidentiality and obtain the original plaintext (which requires the secret symmetric key or the private key of the user), (2) perform the malicious manipulation, (3) calculate the DS of the modified plaintext (which requires the private key of the agent) and (4) perform the ciphering with the symmetric key and the IV derived from the new DS. Therefore two different keys need to be discovered, which makes this attack very unlikely to succeed. The attack for eavesdropping corresponds to step (1).
In the opinion of the cardiologists consulted, undetected manipulation of tests is the worst attack since it can lead to the most harmful result: wrong diagnosis. Private ciphering was intended to protect contents for diagnosis, examination and secure storage, so it offers very high security against manipulation and high security against eavesdropping. Public ciphering was designed to protect less sensitive contents, for teaching/research, and thus it only offers (high) security against manipulation.
Signing the contents
A Digital Signature (DS) is used to support public and private ciphering (see Section 3.2) and demonstrate the authenticity and integrity of the SCP-ECG file. To calculate the DS a safe hash function (SHA-1, SHA-2, RIPEMD-160 or RIPEMD-256) makes a digest of the file content and a public key algorithm (RSA [24] , DSA [26] or ECDSA [27] ) encrypts the digest with the private key of the ECG agent. At the user's end the DS is verified obtaining the hash of the content of the SCP-ECG received and comparing it with the original hash, decrypted with the public key of the ECG agent (extracted from his/her digital certificate). If they match the SCP-ECG is valid, otherwise it is refused. The processes of signature and verification are illustrated in Fig. 3-A. 
Securing the communications
The SCP-ECG describes in Annex D the recommended way to exchange SCP-ECG files and collections of extracted data, using a simple messaging protocol (see Section 2.3). Both the messages and the transferred data must be adequately protected since they contain personal health information. Transport Layer Security (TLS [25] ), the most common choice, can only work on top of standard transport-level protocols (not implemented by the SCP-ECG). Therefore, it is necessary to define an extension of the messaging protocol reproducing the steps and the security measures of TLS: entities authentication based on RSA certificates, exchange of master secrets based on RSA, data integrity based on a hash function, privacy based on a ciphering algorithm.
The messages of identification (type ID), which initiate every exchange sequence in this architecture, will be used to establish the parameters for secure exchange, implementing the step called handshake in TLS. One of these parameters is the RSA certificate, which can also be reused to protect the SCP-ECG files. After the handshake, all the remaining messages and data will be protected using private ciphering (see Section 3.2), which implements the four aforementioned measures.
SCP-ECG extension
The SCP-ECG is a well defined protocol, analyzed in Sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, which can be extended by defining new sections (numbers 12-127 and those above 1023, see [28] ) or employing existing free spaces. Since security is not addressed in any existing section, an entirely new section is proposed. To avoid confusion with regular files we call this new format Protected SCP-ECG. The files are given the extension .pscp for easy distinction.
Section 12 structure
Like the rest of the SCP-ECG sections, this is divided into two parts:
The Section ID Header, which is common to all the sections in the standard (see Fig. 1 ) and precedes the Data Part. It is composed of: -Bytes 1 and 2: 16 bit CRC-CCITT over the entire section (excluding these two bytes). -Bytes 3 and 4: Section ID number.
-Bytes 5-8: Section length including the Section ID header (in bytes). -Byte 9: Version Number of the Section. -Byte 10: Version Number of the Protocol. -Bytes 11-16: Reserved. The Data Part (see Table 1 ), which adopts the structure corresponding to Section 1 to allow the flexible storage of several fields of variable length. Each field details the options (security profile, cryptographic algorithms and parameter values) to set up a Protected SCP-ECG file. These are described by: -The corresponding tag: a specification byte which indicates the field we refer to. It would be possible to use up to 255 different tags, although only 7 are required. -The length: a 2-byte specification indicating the length of the field value (in bytes). The maximum possible length described by 2 unsigned bytes is 65535 bytes, but in practice this value will be much lower. -The parameter data: the content of the field, an element to provide security. If length ¼¼ 0, the tag is empty.
Finally, it is necessary to add the corresponding pointer in Section 0 (see Fig. 1 ) to address the new section, indicating: Section ID number (2 bytes): 12. Section Length (4 bytes). Index to Section (4 bytes).
Section 12 content
The tags included in Section 12 (see Table 1 ) enable the security measures under this extension:
Role-Based Access control by means of security profiles (RBAC, see Section 3.1). Tag involved: 0. Specifies the professional role of the user, the ECG file is protected accordingly. Digital signature (DS, see Section 3.3) to check the reliability of the ECG signal and the rest of the data. Tags involved: 1. Identifies the agent and contains his/her public key (PbKa). 2. Specifies which hash function has been used, taking as input the whole file. 3. Stores the DS, resulting from the encryption of the hash with the public key of the agent. Part-level encryption: by means of -Public ciphering (see Section 3.2), which protects against forgery and manipulation. Tags involved: 0. Indicates which parts are public (see Section 3.1). 4. Specifies which symmetric ciphering algorithm is used to distort the content of the public parts.
Any user can decipher and retrieve the original information since the symmetric key and the IV are obtained from the DS (tag 3), which is public.
-Private ciphering (see Section 3.2), which maintains confidentiality with the patient and protects against forgery and manipulation. Tags involved: 0. Indicates which parts are private (see Section 3.1).
4. Specifies which symmetric ciphering algorithm is used to distort the content of the private parts. 5. Stores the secret symmetric key, randomly generated and protected by the public key of the user.
Only the intended user can recover the symmetric key and decipher the confidential parts, for which he/she needs to load his/ her private key from a password protected file.
Secure communications (see Section 2.3 and Section 3.4), which guarantee authentication, integrity and confidentiality of the transmitted messages and data: -At the beginning of the session it is necessary to perform a handshake: the messages to log-on (type ID) of the ECG agent and the user must include his/her own public RSA certificate (tag 1) for authentication, and also specify the hash function (tag 2) to enable DS and an algorithm for ciphering (tag 4). After that, the handshake finishes with the exchange of a secret key (tag 5, called the master secret in TLS) to cipher the communications. -All the remaining messages (types ID, Status, Done, Advisory, E, I, L, P, R, S) and all data to transmit will be protected using private ciphering (according to the parameters of the handshake). Thus, they must also attach their DS (tag 3). Secure Access Record (SAR, see Section 3.1), which ensures transparency to the patient. Tag involved:
6. Has a double mission: to identify publicly and uniquely the intended user for security profiles 0-2 and to keep an updated list of all granted accesses for profile 3.
The ECG agent can export this list for patient consultation. 
Implementation and use
We have built a simple graphical user interface (see Fig. 4 ) to provide users (clinicians, researchers, hospital system administrators, etc.) with a way to protect their SCP-ECG files and access them easily, following the procedures depicted in Fig. 3 . It is compatible with regular SCP-ECG equipment and software (viewers, editors, parsers). If this extension is adopted officially, ECG devices will be able to provide Protected SCP-ECG files and SCP-ECG viewers will be able to show their contents using the software principles we have already implemented.
All the operations of ciphering, deciphering, writing and checking are carried out by the application. Nevertheless, some interaction is required:
With the agent -to protect the file he/she must (1) set the security profile, (2) choose the block cipher and (3) the hash function, (4) load his/her certificate, (5) his/her private key and (6) the user's certificate. The set [block cipher ID, hash function ID, agent's certificate and agent's private key] can be fixed to save time. We recommend using [AES, SHA2 512, ECDSA] for profiles 0-2, and RSA instead of ECDSA for profile 3. With the user -to access the confidential parts in the protected file he/she must load his/her private key (not necessary for profile 0).
Our graphical user interface is openly available at http://sourceforge.net/projects/pscp/, also as an applet for integration in webpages.
Evaluation
The use of cryptography to protect the information in the original SCP-ECG file severely distorts the ECG waveform and the rest of the data. We chose randomly 30 SCP-ECG from www.openecg.net and calculated the normalized cross correlation, corr 2 ½0; 1, between all pairs of metadata and signals from different files. Related signal pairs, such as leads from the same patient record, obtained corr values higher than 0.6 while unrelated signal (and metadata) pairs obtained values close to 0. As expected, the corr values between pairs of original signals/metadata and their ciphered counterparts were also close to 0, showing the decorrelation power of ciphering.
On the other hand, the security extension of SCP-ECG files also results in a different file size and access time:
File size. The addition of Section 12 implies dealing with bigger files, which will increase the size of the file database and the time used for the transmission. The main factors are the agent's certificate type (tag 1), which also determines the length of the DS (tag 3), and the user's certificate type, which fixes the encrypted symmetric key length (tag 5). They account for approximately 95-99% of the section size. The contribution of the rest of the fields (hash function ID, block cipher ID, etc.) is very low, see Table 2 . For profile 3 the number of entries in tag 6 may grow substantially, so we propose limiting this field to the last 40 accesses (1 KB). Notice in Table 1 that tag 5 is not included for profile 0. The section size ranges from 0.66 (profile 0 with agent's cert EC 192, -no user's cert, 1 entry in tag 7-) to 3.83 KB (profile 3 with agent's cert = user's cert RSA 4096, 40 accesses in tag 7). Since the size of a typical SCP-ECG file is 31 KB, the typical overhead is within 0:66=31 À 3:83=31 ' 2 À 12%. When taking the minimum file size (7.4 KB), the overhead ranges from 0:66=7:4 ' 9% to 3:83=7:4 ' 52%. These results show the importance of choosing ECDSA certificates to reduce the overhead without security degradation. Finally, the overhead for the maximum file size (355 KB) ranges from 0:66=355 ' 0:2% to 3:83=355 ' 1:1%. Protection-access time. This is the average delay introduced by the operations described in Section 4.2: -Protection of a SCP-ECG: typically 0.5-1 s.
-Access: typically 0.5-1 s.
-Protection (profiles 0-3) from a Protected SCP-ECG (profile 3), see Fig. 3-B) : typically 1.5-3 s. The last procedure takes longer because it implies deciphering and ciphering again twice (one time to update the secure access record in the agent's file, another to produce the user's file). Comparing the time to generate a SCP-ECG file ð' 10 À 30 sÞ and the delay to protect it, the latter is only ' 2-10%. Comparing the delay to access a protected file to the time to represent its contents and interpret it (P1 min), the former only represents 65%. Table 1 Structure and content of the protected SCP-ECG Section 12 data part. See the belowmentioned reference for further information. 1 The length of these fields is specified in Table 2 .
To provide a reference of the performance, all the tests were executed on an Intel Core 2 CPU E850 at 3.16 GHz running Windows XP.
Discussion and conclusions
We have designed and built a security extension for the SCP-ECG, giving priority to robustness and ease of use for clinicians caring for the patient, cardiologists who interpret ECGs, researchers, teachers and hospital system administrators, who can keep using their regular SCP-ECG devices, editors and viewers. The intermediate software developed in this work to protect SCP-ECG files and access the protected files is openly available.
An adequate level of resistance to attacks against the security of the files and privacy of the personal data is achieved by means of 
Table 2
Typical size (KB) of Section 12 fields, defined in Table 1. cryptography. Since this is an evolving field, we provide 5 algorithms for ciphering, 3 different hash functions and compatibility with the main public key algorithms (RSA, DSA and ECDSA). Although unlikely, if any of these functions or algorithms becomes vulnerable, it is enough to protect the files by choosing a different one. Besides, if a file is corrupted, all the information will be automatically distorted to warn the user and avoid worse consequences. The use of digital signatures for checking authenticity and integrity and role-based privacy implies that users must have their own digital certificates to make the transactions possible. The certificates associated with electronic IDs are valid for this purpose. It is worth mentioning that the use of digital certificates did not decrease the experience of the consulted cardiologists.
The resources required to perform the protection -access seems low/moderate: typically 2-12% of overhead with respect to the size of a regular file, 2-10% extra delay to protect a newly generated SCP-ECG file and 65% extra delay to access it for interpretation. Thus a good level of availability of the test is technically feasible.
This extension follows the guidelines for security standardization, implementing measures already adopted by major medical protocols: secure communications, role-based access control, attribute level encryption and digital signatures. It also leaves room for the adoption of Audit Trail and Node Authentication policies and addresses the need for future revisions during the life cycle of the protocol.
